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City of Reno v. Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters, 130 Nev. Adv. Op. 100 (Dec. 31, 2014)1 
 
LABOR LAW 
 
Summary 
 
 The Court concluded that the International Association of Firefighters’ (IAFF) grievance 
was not arbitrable under the parties’ collective bargaining agreement (CBA) because the CBA 
explicitly stated the City of Reno’s statutory right to lay off any employee due to a lack of funds.  
Thus, the district court did not have authority under NRS Chapter 38 to grant injunctive relief.   
 
Background 
 
 In May 2014, the City of Reno laid off 32 firefighters.  The City based its decision on a 
“lack of funds” and the need to allocate resources elsewhere.  Article 2 of the CBA between the 
City and the IAFF lists certain rights, including the right to lay off any employee due to a lack of 
funds, which are not subject to mandatory bargaining.  The IAFF filed a grievance claiming there 
was no actual shortage of funds to support the City’s decision.  The grievance was denied and the 
IAFF requested that the issue be submitted to arbitration.   
 The IAFF filed a complaint in the district court setting out four claims for relief: 
anticipatory breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, 
injunctive relief, and declaratory relief.  The IAFF claimed that the layoffs violated the CBA and 
that the City had enough funds to continue paying the firefighters.  The IAFF filed a motion for 
injunctive relief under NRS Chapter 38.   
 The district court concluded that the court had authority under NRS 38.222 to rule on the 
request for injunctive relief.  The district court granted the IAFF’s request for a preliminary 
injunction and enjoined the City from laying off the firefighters.  The City appealed.  
 
Discussion 
 
 The Court first analyzed the district court’s conclusion that the court had authority under 
NRS 38.222 to grant a preliminary injunction while the IAFF pursued arbitration.  NRS 38.222 
allows the district court, before an arbitrator is able to act in a dispute, to, “enter an order for 
provisional remedies to protect the effectiveness of the arbitral proceeding to the same extent and 
under the same conditions as if the controversy were the subject of a civil action.”2  In order to 
determine whether the district court acted properly in granting the injunctive relief, the Court had 
to determine whether the City’s layoff decision was subject to arbitration under the terms of the 
CBA.  
 The Court explained that while arbitration is the favored means of resolving labor 
disputes, “labor arbitration is a product of contract, and, therefore, its legal basis depends entirely 
upon the particular contracts of particular parties.”3  Therefore, the arbitrator’s jurisdiction is 
                                                        
1  By Scott Lundy. 
2  NEV. REV. STAT.  § 38.222(1) (2013).  
3  Port Huron Area Sch. Dist. V. Port Huron Educ. Ass’n, 393 N.W.2d 811, 814 (Mich. 1986).  
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limited to disputes over the terms of the collective bargaining contract.  Thus, the Court turned to 
the language of the CBA to determine whether the dispute was subject to arbitration.   
 The Court found that the parties expressly agreed in Article 2 of the CBA to reserve for 
the City the, “right to reduce in force or lay off any employee because of lack of work or lack of 
funds, subject to paragraph (v) of subsection 2, of NRS 288.150.”  The Court said this express 
agreement was the “most forceful evidence” that layoffs due to lack of funds are not subject to 
mandatory bargaining and therefore, “falls outside the scope of the CBA”.  Thus, the language of 
the CBA provides evidence of the parties’ intent to exclude the City’s layoff decision from 
arbitration.   
 Furthermore, the Court observed that layoffs due to lack of funds are excluded from 
mandatory bargaining and reserved to local governments by law.  NRS 288.150(3)(b) reserves to 
local governments, “the right to reduce in force or lay off any employee because of lack of work 
or lack of money, subject to paragraph (v) of subsection 2.”4   
 The Court then examined the district court’s claim that allowing these layoffs would 
mean public employees would have no ability to bargain over the procedures for reduction in 
workforce.  This was erroneous because the procedures for reducing the workforce do require 
mandatory bargaining.5  It is only the right to reduce workforce that is protected from mandatory 
bargaining.  Here, the IAFF did not allege that the City violated the bargained for procedures for 
reducing workforce; only that their underlying claim of lack of funds was erroneous.   
 The Court rejected the IAFF’s argument that the question of arbitrability should be left to 
the arbitrator.  The Court said that the issue of arbitrability is generally an issue for judicial 
determination.  Furthermore, it was clear from the language of the CBA that the issue of budget-
related layoffs was excluded from mandatory bargaining and thus, was not subject to arbitration.  
Thus, the Court declined to defer to the arbitrator to determine arbitrability.   
 
Conclusion 
 
 The Court held that because the issue of budget-related layoffs was not arbitrable, per the 
parties’ agreed upon CBA and NRS 288.150(3)(b), the district court lacked authority under NRS 
38.222 to rule on the request for injunctive relief.  As such, the preliminary injunction was 
wrongly entered.  The Court reversed the district court’s order.   
                                                        
4  NEV. REV. STAT. § 288.150(3)(b) (2013).  
5  NEV. REV. STAT. § 288.150(2)(v) (2013) (the scope of mandatory bargaining is limited to procedures for reduction 
in workforce consistent with the provisions of this chapter).  
